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CAN HISTORY TEACH US PEACE? 
James Smith Page 
Abstract 
The idea that we can learn from history is a recurring one and this essay examines 
dialectically the arguments for and against the proposition that history can teach us 
peace. Eight objections to the proposition that we can teach peace through history are 
discussed: 1) the problem that history implies a social inevitability, 2) the difficulty in 
ascribing moral or ethical responsibility in historical explanation, 3) the reliance on 
counterfactual history in attempting to teach peace through history, 4) the war-centred 
nature of history, 5) the violence-centred nature of history, 6) the depersonalized 
construction of war in history, 7) the past-centred nature of history, 8) the problem of 
despair. The conclusion to this essay is that the teaching of peace is possible, although 
one does need to be mindful of the limitations to such a project and to have a 
deliberately open view of the future. [This Abstract did not appear in the published 
version of the article]. 
Essay 
Sometimes articulated by historians, but more often by philosophers and educators, 
there’s a recurring idea that we can learn from history, as problematic as this may well 
be. Thus it is said that we study history to learn from history. Indeed it can be argued 
that individuals would not bother to write history if it had no implicit didactic purpose. 
Since history tends to be the history of violence, statements about learning from 
history generally imply that we can somehow learn to be more peaceful. But teaching 
and learning peace through teaching history has many problems. Using a dialectical 
method, we can outline a series of arguments against teaching peace through history, 
and the responses to those arguments. This will help us to understand what’s required 
to effectively educate for peace.  
A first objection against peace education through teaching history stems from either 
actual or perceived historical inevitability. Within the teaching of history it is difficult 
to avoid a certain fatalism that suggests that because wars have happened in human 
history, therefore they will always happen. War becomes inevitable. Of course, 
historical inevitability is very much something the mind constructs. Within every 
moment there is the existential reality of the open future. But any discussion of 
causation tends to imply that history could have taken no other course than the one it 
did. In other words, the message of history can be taken as extremely negative and 
fatalistic: that war and wars are inevitable.  
Short of providing a detailed analysis of historical inevitability, we can at least 
examine the integral notion of time as a constructed phenomenon. The reality of 
experiencing the “now” is something each one of us knows instinctively: we 
intuitively know that as individuals we can and do make authentic decisions. This also 
holds true for history. Thus, notwithstanding the illusion or pretext that at any time 
there are no alternatives to violence, it is possible to assert that at any time actors can 
opt for peaceful and non-violent alternatives to violence, even if only in incremental 
ways.  
Of course, asserting the alternatives to both war and structural violence constitutes 
one of the major themes in peace research. The corollary is that at any time in past 
history these peaceful and non-violent alternatives also existed, and that the violence 
that occurred in the past was therefore not inevitable. No war is inevitable. 
Interestingly, a belief in war’s inevitability can be identified as a crucial cause of war 
itself, since it engenders the mentality of the pre-emptive strike. The inevitability 
belief functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Against this, the existence of alternatives 
to violence must be asserted. [441/442]  
A second argument against teaching peace through history centres on the difficulty of 
ascribing moral or ethical responsibility in historical explanation. This can be 
described as a more general sociological or psychological problem, although it finds a 
focus in historical explanation. The problem is this: whenever we give a historical 
explanation we tend to absolve the individuals involved of any moral responsibility 
for their actions. War therefore becomes something that simply happens: it is 
supposedly caused by a set of circumstances, rather than by the actions of individuals 
and groups at a particular time. The problem is summed up neatly in the aphorism, 
Tout comprendre, c’est tout pardoner - to understand all is to forgive all. The view 
that nobody is responsible for war is also reflected in the rhetoric of tragedy and 
catastrophe that so often describes both the origins and course of war. Tragedy and 
catastrophe are metaphors of events outside human control, and the implication is that 
war is somehow fated or divine, rather than having human origins. Similarly, those 
engaging in war regularly claim there was no alternative besides engaging in war. The 
implication is that circumstances have dictated a course of action, and they are not 
responsible. 
How does one react to this problem of historical explanation? One response is that 
historical explanation (and indeed sociological and psychological explanation) only 
describes predispositions or receptive circumstances for events to occur. Thus in 
making historical explanations we need to show the limits of applying causation to 
any problem or event: ultimately the reason for a person deciding to take a particular 
action is that he or she decided to take that decision. This also applies on a collective 
scale. It may well be that we can assign a range of causative factors that encourage a 
particular country’s leadership to opt for war, but ultimately the choice of war results 
from a decision by that country’s leadership. Even when a country is supposedly the 
non-aggressor, the leadership of the country invaded usually has made decisions that 
have encouraged the invasion. Even where there is no contributory culpability, the 
invaded nation’s leadership still has the option of practicing non-violent resistance. In 
most cases in the 20th century, invaded countries have opted for violent resistance. 
War making is more than a matter of circumstances - it is a matter of choice. 
Moreover, not only does war making involve decision making by leaders but also by 
citizens of the country, since people have the capacity to dissent. It’s true that within 
totalitarian societies, exercising the right of dissent may require extraordinary courage 
and organization, but if the power of government rests upon the consent of the 
governed, then war making also rests upon the consent of the individual. Thus, within 
a war-making exercise, the citizens of a country are exercising, by consent, a moral 
and historical decision to support the war. 
A third argument against peace education through history centres on counterfactual 
history. This is in many ways related to the problem of historical inevitability and the 
problems associated with a doctrine of historical inevitability for encouraging peace 
making. If, from a peace perspective, one asserts that war and structural violence are 
not historical inevitabilities, that history is not pre-determined, then one is forced to 
suggest that at any stage in history there are (were) alternatives available to those 
involved in the process of history. In other words, there are (were) alternatives to 
conflict. This tends to involve what [442/443] is known as counterfactual history, that 
is, history-that-did-not-happen, or, more precisely, history-that-could-have-happened. 
Counterfactual history envisages alternative futures from the way events did take 
place.  
Historians are hesitant in accepting the validity of counterfactual history, but the 
strongest denunciation of the possibility of counterfactual history comes from those 
within the realist tradition in international relations theory. Perhaps we do need to take 
seriously the possibility of imaging or imagining possible alternative courses to past 
history, especially peaceful courses fir past history. Counterfactual history can indeed 
be argued to be the opposite of the monistic and deterministic outlook of historical 
inevitability: if we contend that war is or was not necessary or inevitable, then it is 
quite valid to examine what “could have happened” if individuals had acted 
differently.  
Moreover, much historical peace research and historical writing seems to contain an 
implied counterfactual history, without this being identified as such. Thus when we 
point out the consequences of the lack of international conferencing in July 1914 we 
are implicitly suggesting that with international conferencing a completely different 
course of events could have followed in August 1914. Those who write about the 
failure of the Disarmament Conference of 1932 seem to imply that the world war that 
erupted years later would not have been possible, at least not in the destructive form it 
did take, if the Conference had been successful. Those who argue the efficacy of’ 
non-violent resistance to Nazism seem also to be implicitly suggesting that if such 
non-violent resistance had been more widespread, then a totally different course of 
events could have taken place in the 193Os and 1940s. Critics may well argue that 
such counterfactuals are endless, although this is precisely the point. The possibilities 
for peace in history have been endless, just as our opportunities arc now endless to 
work for and create peace.  
A fourth argument against peace education through history is the war-centred nature 
of history. Given the role of war in forming and mobilizing society, the war-centred 
nature of historical analysis is something we should expect, but the problem for 
teaching peace through history is that one constantly focuses upon war. History tends 
to be organized around conflict, be this conflict between individual rulers or, in the 
recent modern era, between collectivities. Even in socialist versions of history, war 
remains a central organizing paradigm, although in this instance in the form of class 
warlike. To some extent more recent historians have attempted to balance such a 
state-centric view by creating social histories, concentrating on the experience of the 
common people. Even with such a history-from-below approach, it is still difficult to 
completely avoid the dominant image of war as a mobilizing and socializing force. It 
may be that we no longer define history through battles as such, although we still tend 
to define history as being pre-war, inter-war, and post-war eras, and so forth. It is 
difficult to avoid war as the defining characteristic of history.  
What is the solution to the problem of war-centred history? We should acknowledge 
that war has been crucial in forming human society. Who we are very much reflects 
the role of war in modern history, but the positive aspects of war, namely 
organizational and technological development, are due not to war’s [443/444] 
intrinsic nature but rather to the commitment war engenders amongst individuals. In 
other words, given the political will, the organizational and technological 
development during wartime or amidst the threat of war could well be achieved 
within a peaceful society. Further responses to the war-centred nature of history 
include emphasizing that war is not inevitable; that is, that at any stage there were 
alternatives to war, and indeed there are alternatives today. In addition, we can 
emphasize the experience of common people during times of war, and the individual 
pain and suffering they endure.  
A fifth and related objection to the teaching of peace through history is the violence-
centred nature of history. Just as violence tends to be an object of fascination within 
fiction, so too violence tends to be a focus of attention within history. Co-operation 
and a peaceful life tend to be regarded as unremarkable, whereas violence and cruelty 
stand out. Of course, there are good reasons to try to learn from the dramatic failures 
experienced by human societies in the past, and from the recourse to collective 
violence. But we should beware against this leading to a voyeuristic and vicarious 
enjoyment, a Schadenfreude, from concentrating so much on violence and even the 
horrific in history. It is as if we can participate in a war in the safety of an armchair, 
cinema, or seminar room, without the danger of actual physical injury, and thereby re-
assure and comfort ourselves that no matter how mundane or disappointing our lives 
might be, at least we are safe. History can serve as a form of de-actualizing war. 
It is difficult to deal with violence in history simply, given the role of violence in 
defining both the nation-state and the current global economic divisions. It is 
sometimes difficult to avoid the conclusion that history is a discipline that 
concentrates upon violence, both in the sense that violence compels individuals to 
write, and that violence compels us to attempt to make sense of what has happened. It 
is violence that most readily forms a theme for history. Peace writer Coleman 
McCarthy refers to history being in effect not peace but violence studies, and goes so 
far as to suggest that World Wars should be renamed World Slaughter One and World 
Slaughter Two. Elaine Scarry has suggested that our descriptions of violence, and thus 
by implication our historical descriptions, are essentially fictive, due to the traumatic 
nature of doing otherwise. 
On one level one can respond by concentrating on the elements of cooperation and 
non-violence within modern history. Certainly much evidence in the world history of 
the past decade would support the efficacy of non-violence and peaceful co-operation 
in achieving enduring change. Perhaps also, as is implied within the writings of 
McCarthy and Scarry, we should be more truthful in describing the violence within 
historical narrative.  
On a deeper psychological level, however, we should acknowledge our fascination 
with death and violence. As Erasmus noted, Dolce bellum inexpertis— war is sweet to 
those who have not experienced it. Why is this so? One explanation is that war does 
present a unique crucible wherein human character is tested. William Shakespeare 
seems to have known this well, and within his work one often finds war and battle 
depicted as the arena wherein the drama of good versus evil is played out. Another 
explanation is that our fascination with the horrific and the violent paradoxically 
reflects our inner fears of such violence: [444/445] experiencing war and violence 
through either film or literature is one way of engaging our fears directly without 
really being hurt. It is a vicarious involvement in war. If this is the case, then the 
important point is to identify and recognize the process, and to realize that humankind 
is essentially pacific by nature, despite our fascination with violence. Indeed it is 
precisely because we are by nature pacific beings which makes violence both 
newsworthy and history-worthy.  
A sixth argument against peace education through the teaching of history is the way 
war tends to be constructed in historical analysis. It is difficult to avoid the implicit 
metaphor in historical narrative that war is a large-scale chess game, rather than an 
activity involving human lives. Wars tend to be described as personal contests 
between nations, between armies, between regiments, between military commanders, 
and at times, even between world leaders. Those who construct historical narratives 
generally know the more obvious instances of “anthropomorphic error;” that is, 
treating non-human entities as if they were human beings. But it is much more 
difficult to avoid the “anthropomorphic effect;” that is, describing the actors in wars 
in a way that creates an illusion that they are merely enlarged sporting contests.  
Of course, the irony of the anthropomorphic effect is that war is thereby de-
humanized. On one level it may be true to describe a particular battle as one armoured 
division moving in a particular direction, and this advance being countered by an 
opposing armoured division, but this mode of description obscures the human reality 
of war. What is crucial is what is not being described: the individual human beings 
who are killed or maimed due to what is happening, or indeed the fear experienced by 
such individuals, which will often mark the rest of their lives. In addition, what also 
tends not be described is the impact upon civilians within war zones. 
One approach to portraying the reality of war (and indeed of structural violence) is to 
refer to the war deaths involved. Peace research has often centred on just an approach, 
but one could also argue that this empirical approach is part of the problem, for 
reciting numbers of those killed in conflict (or who have starved due to structural 
inequities) tends not only to numb sensitivity but also to re-enforce the sense that 
individual life is not important. Thus, we read of near to a million battle-deaths in the 
struggle over Verdun in 1916, and the natural tendency is to infer that a thousand or 
even a hundred battle-deaths elsewhere is somehow less significant. The implicit 
tendency within the war narrative is to diminish the importance of the individual and 
the death of the individual. This stands in contrast with an ethos of non-violence, 
which emphasizes that each individual is valuable and worthy, and thus every 
unnecessary death by actual or structural violence is significant. 
At a deeper level one can argue that the description of war and structural violence 
should be more ethnographic and less statistical. Unfortunately even this narrative or 
ethnographic approach to war has problems. It is easy for the life histories of 
individual combatants (and non-combatants) to become hagiography, either 
consciously or unconsciously, in that the undoubted self-sacrifice of the individuals 
involved in times of war become a model for emulation. The theme of heroic self-
sacrifice is, after all, one of the themes of both military history and social history in 
wartime, and a theme that is constantly replayed in war [445/446] memorials. War 
becomes, subtly, the arena wherein the individual and the nation are tested, and 
thereby, subtly, something to be desired.  
How should we respond on a pedagogical level? The answer seems to be this: we 
should not deny the altruism of those involved in wars, as is constantly re-enforced in 
war narratives. But we should also elucidate what Reinhold Niebuhr called the 
“paradox of patriotism.” That is, in wartime, conduct that might, on an individual 
level, be quite noble and altruistic—namely, a patriotic willingness to sacrifice 
oneself to protect family and kinfolk—turns out on the social level to be destructive 
and evil—namely, the willingness to kill others against whom the individual has no 
real grievance. In other words, pedagogically, we should be working towards an 
understanding of the structural dynamics of nationalism and the nation-state within 
any historical narrative.  
A seventh problem with peace education through the teaching of history is that history 
is axiomatically past-oriented, whereas the focus in peace and peace research tends to 
be future-oriented. Indeed, peace education often emphasizes the importance of 
imagining and imaging the future, or of visualizing the sort of world we would like to 
have in the future. Of course, one might well argue that we could proceed from the 
past error to the present and future alternatives. Nevertheless, the futuristic and 
utopian nature of peace and peace education does not sit comfortably with a discipline 
that emphasizes the past. This tension might be resolved by recognizing history’s 
limitations. As important as the past is, it is not as crucial as the present in which we 
live, and the future that is open to us. 
This notwithstanding, our understanding of the present, and how we interpret the 
events around us, is clearly framed by our understanding of the past. For example, 
since 1945, Western leaders have routinely used the Munich analogy, which suggests 
that military action is needed to avoid repeating the failure of the European 
democracies to deal with Adolf Hitler in 1938. The analogy has been used to justify 
Western military engagements in Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, and most recently, 
the bombing of Serbia. Historically, this is a flawed analogy since it assumes that the 
only firm response to aggression is a military one. The analogy also ignores the events 
that preceded the appeasement at Munich, but the continuing use of the analogy does 
underscore the power of historical understanding. 
Of course, the radical constructivist perspective on history claims that the past exists 
only within our imagination. This view stresses the importance of the historical 
imagination, of formulating a particular perspective on the past, and of understanding 
historical interpretation as a mythogenic exercise. But for the historical myths we 
create, we must ask whether they reinforce a future that is open or closed. Do our 
myths create the possibility of a peaceful future and the creative resolution of tension, 
or do they promise only endless destruction? As the creators of our myths, the 
decision lies very much with us.  
The eighth problem of peace education through history is despair. When one 
examines either the progress of peace advocacy or the individual and collective 
attempts to avoid violence, the historical record may well encourage hopelessness. 
The narrative of history is arguably quite horrific, involving a cycle of violence and 
genocide, enclosed within repeated hopes and plans for peace. [446/447] When we 
consider the horrors of the past, it makes it difficult to imagine a more positive future. 
Why focus on history if this will be the only result? Shouldn’t peace education instead 
encourage a more hopeful vision?  
Much depends on what we mean by history and the historical record. On one level, 
there is already a forgotten or underdeveloped narrative that emphasizes a history of 
love and nurturing, joy and fulfilment. It is a narrative of the common people. In 
contrast, most conventional historiography emphasizes nation-states and statecraft, 
and therefore conflict and violence. In other words we need to look at other histories.  
On the other hand, we must also confront our despair. In Jungian terms, we must 
examine our own dark natures. In recent times, advocates of intrapersonal peace 
theory, such as Joanna Macy, have begun to confront despair, and reject the 
superficial optimism that undergirds popular culture. Only when we truly examine the 
horrors of recent modern history, in the real and not the imagined past, can we 
develop the passionate conviction that they should not be repeated in the future.  
How then can we summarize what we require to educate for peace through the 
teaching of history? We need to understand importance but also the limitations of 
history for promoting peace education. We need a utopian approach to history, one 
that recognizes both the openness of history and the openness of our own experience. 
According to Patrick Slattery we need an eschatological curriculum, that is, an open-
ended view of human history. The future is open, and each of us has the opportunity 
(and responsibility) to help forge a more humane and pacific future. If as educators or 
historians, we can say that each moment is open and free, then we can also suggest 
that peace is more than a noble hope but rather a realizable objective for the future.  
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